Alaska Native Sovereignty: The Limits of the Tribe-Indian Country Test by Marston, Blythe W.
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 17
Issue 2 Summer 1984 Article 5
Alaska Native Sovereignty: The Limits of the Tribe-
Indian Country Test
Blythe W. Marston
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marston, Blythe W. (1984) "Alaska Native Sovereignty: The Limits of the Tribe-Indian Country Test," Cornell International Law
Journal: Vol. 17: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol17/iss2/5
ALASKA NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY: THE LIMITS OF
THE TRIBE-INDIAN COUNTRY TEST
The United States' policy toward American Indians vacillates
between the goals of assimilation and promotion of tribal autonomy,
breeding confusion and inconsistency in Indian law.1 In settling
Alaska Native land claims, Congress used an unprecedented corporate
structure in an attempt to promote both assimilation and self-determi-
nation.2 As a result, the status of Alaska Native sovereignty3 is
unclear.
A group of Alaska Natives, organized under the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act,4 recently asserted their sovereignty by seeking to enforce
an ordinance excluding non-Natives from the village of Tyonek. That
1. Analysis of Indian law requires an understanding of specific terms.
The term "Indian" has no uniform definition. It varies from tribe to tribe and from
statute to statute. For example, the Indian Reorganization Act defines "Indian" to mean a
person of one half or more Indian blood, but does not require tribal affiliation. 25 U.S.C.
§ 479 (1982). The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, however,
requires membership in a tribe. Indian Self-Determination Assistance Act of 1975, 25
U.S.C. § 450b(a) (1982).
"Indian country" is an Indian reservation, a dependent Indian community, or an Indian
allotment. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982).
"Indian reservation" has no statutory definition, but the modem meaning refers to land
set aside under federal protection for residence of tribal Indians. See F. COHEN, HAND-
BOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 34 (1982 ed.) [hereinafter cited as F. COHEN, 1982 ed.].
"Indian sovereignty" refers to powers of self-government retained by Indian tribes and
neither explicitly limited by treaty or federal statute nor inherently inconsistent with the
federal-tribe relationship. See infra text accompanying notes 7-18. Chief Justice Marshall
characterized Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" whose relation "to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). Thus, Indian sovereignty paradoxically depends on the federal govern-
ment. Because Indian sovereignty can be limited by treaty or federal statute, it is charac-
terized as "limited sovereignty." Indian sovereignty is also characterized as "inherent" and
"retained," because it consists of the original and remaining powers of self-government.
See F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra, at 235.
"Indian tribe" does not have a uniform legal definition. The Bureau of Indian Affairs,
however, relies upon the definition in Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901). "By
a 'tribe' we understand a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a commu-
nity under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-
defined territory. . . ." Id. at 266. See infra text accompanying notes 22-25.
2. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act [ANCSA], Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688
(1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982)). See infra note 73 and
accompanying text.
3. The most important general principle in American Indian law is inherent sover-
eignty. It holds that Indian tribes retain inherent powers of self-government that are not
explicitly limited by the federal government. See infra text accompanying notes 10-18. See
generally F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 232-41 (discussing the nature of tribal
powers).
4. See infra notes 78, 113-15 and accompanying text.
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exercise of sovereignty is at issue in Native Village of Tyonek v. Puck-
ett.5 This Note examines the utility of traditional Indian sovereignty
criteria to analyze Alaska Native sovereignty since passage of the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). 6 Section I examines
the origins of Indian sovereignty, the traditional tribe-Indian country
analysis, the scope of the power to exclude non-Indians, and Alaska
Native sovereignty. Section II presents Native Village of Tyonek v.
Puckett and examines the case in light of the traditional tribe-Indian
country analysis. Section III proposes a new sovereignty analysis,
based not upon formalistic tests of tribe and Indian country but upon
an assessment of the historical relationship between Natives and non-
Natives and upon the goals of federal Indian policy as expressed by
ANCSA.
I
BACKGROUND
A. INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
1. The Origin of Tribal Sovereignty
Early theorists argued that tribal sovereignty is a natural right
predicated on the humanity and rationality of mankind. Because
international law is a subset of this pervasive rational order, these the-
orists accorded tribal sovereignty the protection of the law of nations.7
Similarly, early colonists could not ignore tribal sovereignty when con-
fronted with Indian assertions of dominion over people and territory.
By negotiating treaties with the Indians, the colonists gave credence to
the theorists' notion that tribal sovereignty should receive the protec-
5. Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, No. A82-369 Civ. (D. Alaska filed Sept. 26,
1982).
6. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 88 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1628 (1982)).
7. Three European scholars of the Middle Ages, Francisco de Victoria, Emmerich de
Vattel, and Hugo Grotius, had a profound influence on the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.
Francisco de Victoria argued that although Indians are heretics, they have a natural right
to property. This view received papal support in 1537 in the Bull Sublimis Deus, which
forbade deprivation of Indians' liberty and property. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian
Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEo. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1942). "Almost word for
word, this declaration of human rights is repeated in the first important law of the United
States on Indian relations, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, adopted two years before the
Federal Constitution.. . ..." Id. at 12. See 32 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 334, 34041 (R. Hill ed. 1936).
For examples of the influence of Grotius and Vattel on tribal sovereignty doctrine, see
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543, 559-61 (1832); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 568-69 (1823); Comment, A New Constitutional.Approach to the Doc-
trine of Tribal Sovereignty, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 371, 376-85 (1978); Clineball & Thom-
son, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of Native Americans Under
International Law, 27 BUFFALO L. REv. 669, 679 (1978).
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tion of international law.8 The United States continued this pattern of
diplomacy, thus recognizing the tribes as sovereigns.9
Tribal sovereignty, however, is subordinate to the sovereignty of
the United States. 10 Chief Justice Marshall addressed the paradox of a
subordinate sovereign in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia" and Worcester
v. Georgia.12 In Cherokee Nation, Marshall portrayed the tribes as
"domestic dependent nations" having a "relationship to the United
States resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian."'1 3 In Worcester,
Marshall stated that "the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that
a weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self-
government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protec-
tion."' 4 The tribes, he stated, were "independent political
communities." 15
Courts, administrators, and commentators have struggled with
the paradox of a relationship between a sovereign and a dependent
sovereign. A Department of the Interior opinion addressed the prob-
lem, emphasizing the tribes' inherent sovereignty:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers is
marked by adherence to three fundamental principles: An Indian tribe pos-
sesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign State. Conquest
renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States and, in
substance, terminates the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe,. . . but
does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe .... These pow-
ers are subject to be qualified by treaties and by express legislation of Congress,
but save as thus expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are
vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of
8. The United States stopped negotiating treaties with Indians in 1871. See infra note
48 and accompanying text. But see Cayuga Indians Claims, 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 173,
20 AM. J. INT'L L. 574 (Amer. & Brit. Cl. Arb. Trib. 1926) (compensatory award to Cana-
dian Cayugas for taking of tribal lands based on equitable grounds and not on the theory
that the tribe is a legal unit under international law).
9. The dictionary definition of "sovereign" is "one that exercises supreme authority
within a limited sphere." WEnsTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1104 (1973 ed.). In
this Note, the term "sovereignty" refers to the "inherent political independence" to which
some native groups are entitled, and the term "exercise of sovereignty" refers to various
powers that a sovereign may attempt to exercise. See F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at
246-57 (discussing powers retained by inherently sovereign tribes). This Note's proposed
analysis identifies the existence of sovereignty by reference to natural rights theory and
analyzes limits on the exercise of sovereignty by reference to limits imposed by the federal
government. See infra text accompanying notes 151-60.
10. F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 232; see, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1923).
11. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18-20 (1831) (Court lacked jurisdiction under U.S. Constitution,
art. III, because Cherokee Nation is not foreign state).
12. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 (1832) ("Cherokee nation. . . is a distinct community occu-
pying own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
have no force .... ").
13. 30 U.S. at 17.
14. 31 U.S. at 560-61.
15. Id. at 559.
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government. 16
Recent decisions have reaffirmed the principle of inherent sover-
eignty. 17 The tribes retain political independence, except as limited by
express provisions in federal statutes and treaties and restraints inher-
ent in the protectorate relationship. As a result, despite the supportive
role that natural law originally played in establishing the doctrine of
tribal sovereignty, Indian sovereignty is subject to complete
abrogation. 18
2. The Components of Indian Sovereignty
Traditionally, courts have relied on a "tribe-Indian country"
analysis to determine whether a tribal act, such as the exclusion of
non-Indians from Indian country, is a valid exercise of sovereign
power. A court asks whether the Indian group is a tribe19 and, if so,
16. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 22 (1934) (Solic. Op.). But see In re
Sah Quah, 31 F. 327, 329 (D. Alaska 1886) (in purchasing Alaska from Russia [1867
Treaty of Cession] and in laws governing Alaska, "United States has at no time recognized
any tribal independence. . ." of Alaska Indians; thirteenth amendment prohibition against
slavery applies to them). The Solicitor's Opinion referred to this holding, but did not con-
front its inconsistency with inherent sovereignty. "It is recognized, of course, that those
provisions of the Federal Constitution which are completely general in scope, such as the
Thirteenth Amendment, apply to the members of Indian tribes as well as to all other
inhabitants of the nation." 55 Interior Dec. at 24.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978) (Constitution's
double jeopardy clause does not bar successive tribal and federal prosecution of tribal mem-
ber; tribal courts are not arms of federal government, but derive authority from retained
tribal sovereignty); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978) (federal
statute could not be interpreted as implicitly abolishing tribe's common law immunity from
suit); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563-66 (1981) (inherent sovereignty does not
extend to regulations of hunting and fishing on non-Indian lands within reservation). The
Wheeler Court distinguished between retained and divested inherent powers.
The areas in which. . . implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have
occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and non-mem-
bers of the tribe. . . . These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status
of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with
their freedom independently to determine their external relations.
435 U.S. at 326.
18. "The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though pre-
sumably such power will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will
not only justify the government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but
may demand, in the interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it
should do so. When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the United
States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to abrogate
existed in Congress ....
. . . In any event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary
cannot question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of this
legislation."
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 594 (1977) (quoting Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553, 566, 568 (1903)). For an argument that U.S. treaty obligations to Indians
may be judicially enforceable, see Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust
Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
19. See supra note 1, infra text accompanying notes 22-25.
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whether the tribe is exercising its jurisdiction within Indian country.20
Once a group of Indians is found to be a tribe acting within Indian
country, exercises of tribal sovereignty are presumed valid unless they
are explicitly limited by federal treaty or statute or unless they are
inherently inconsistent with the federal-Indian relationship. 21
a. The Tribe
An Indian group must be a "tribe" in order to obtain federal rec-
ognition of its sovereignty. The focus of federal Indian law is thus on
the tribe rather than on individual Indians.22 Federal Indian law,
however, does not contain an explicit, comprehensive legal definition
of the term "tribe, '23 and Congress has never provided one. Instead,
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches recognize different
groups of Indians as tribes for various purposes.24 Tribal analysis is
splintered; the definition of "tribe" depends on the purpose for which
the word is used.25
b. Indian Country
A tribe needs the territorial jurisdiction referred to as "Indian
country" in order to exercise some of its sovereign powers, such as the
power to exclude. 26 Congress defined Indian country to include reser-
20. See supra note 1, infra text accompanying notes 26-31.
21. Save as expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the
Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government. Consequently, it
is necessary to examine legislation and treaties limiting tribal powers of self-gov-
ernment and the manner in which the external sovereign powers of tribes necessar-
ily have been circumscribed by their subjection to the ultimate authority of the
United States.
F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 242. See McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty:
Accomodating Tribal, State, and Federal Interests, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 357
(1978).
22. Federal law generally focuses on tribes and their members, rather than on Indians
as a racial minority. See, eg., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (employ-
ment preference statute is only constitutionally applicable to tribal members). But there
are some exceptions, however, such as the criminal jurisdiction statute for Indian country,
which uses the term "Indian" without specifically limiting it to tribe members. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (1982). Persons of Indian ancestry fall within the/scope of this juris-
dictional statute irrespective of tribal membership. See The Snyder Act of 1921, 25 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1982) (applies to "Indians throughout the United States"). But see United States v.
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 n.7 (1977) (questioning whether Indians who are not enrolled
as members of a tribe fall within criminal jurisdiction); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 212-
30 (1974) (administrative policy limits benefits to Indians who live on or near the reserva-
tion and maintain close tribal ties).
23. In 1978, however, the Department of the Interior promulgated Procedures for
Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 25 C.F.R. § 83
(1984). See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 109-31.
25. See generally F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 3.
26. The term "Indian country" has a long legislative and judicial history dating back to
at least the Indian Non-Intercourse Act of 1834. F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 27-
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vations, Indian allotments, and dependent Indian communities. 27 An
Indian country determination is thus usually straightforward, 28
because the existence and boundaries of reservations and allotments
are often statutorily or administratively defined.
Dependent Indian communities, however, are not statutorily
defined. 29 They are "those tribal Indian communities under federal
protection that did not originate in either a federal or tribal act of
'reserving' or were not specifically designated as a reservation. 3 0 The
dependent Indian community category does not refer to types of land
ownership or reservation boundaries, but to residential Indian com-
munities under federal protection.3 1 Therefore, establishing the exist-
28. "Indian country" is now defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982). Case law has applied the
same definition to civil jurisdiction. See DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425,
427 n.2 (1975) (noting limited state jurisdiction in Indian country); Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 478-79 (1976) (upholding taxation of sales of ciga-
rettes on reservation to non-Indians).
The DeCoteau Court's extension of the Indian country definition to civil jurisdiction was
criticized in People of S. Naknek v. Bristol Bay Borough, 466 F. Supp. 870, 877 n. 1 (D.
Alaska 1979): "[D]ictum in a footnote does not settle the issue of the extent to which the
definition of 'Indian Country' in the criminal statutes applies to a question of tax jurisdic-
tion. In addition, the authority for this proposition cited by the Court does not support it."
Former Congressman Lloyd Meeds, Vice Chairman of the American Indian Policy Review
Commission, also criticized the DeCoteau decision in the final report of the American
Indian Policy Review Commission:
[I]t may be that the reach of Federal criminal statutes is broader than the area
within which Indians are to be immune from State civil laws and courts.
There is uncertainty about the meaning of 'Indian country' which only Congress
can cure. Worse yet, there is a danger that misuse of the statutory definition of
Indian country given in 18 U.S.C. 1151 for purposes of Federal criminal jurisdic-
tion will result in inappropriate extensions of tribal powers and restrictions on
State power. Congress should undertake to define 'Indian country' for the various
purposes for which the term is used.
AMERICAN INDIAN POL'Y REVIE W COMM'N, 95 CONG., IST SESS., FINAL REPORT, Vol. 1,
at 601 (Comm. Print 1977).
In defense of the DeCoteau extension, however,
Indian country is a jurisdictional term used in the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act,
Ch. 161, sec. 1, 4 Stat. 729. . . .The 1834 definition was repealed in 1874 (R.S.
5596), and the term was left to court interpretation until the 1948 revision of the
federal statutes. Further, Public Law 280 uses the term Indian country as the
territorial description for both criminal and civil jurisdiction.
R. Price, Legal Status of Alaska Natives: A Report to the Alaska Statehood Commission
91 (1982) (recounting the arguments of Professor David Getches to the Alaska Statehood
Commission concerning errors in the analysis of People of S. Naknek v. Bristol Bay Bor-
ough, 466 F. Supp. 870 (D. Alaska 1979)); F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 345.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982). See supra note 1.
28. See F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 1-46.
29. The term "dependent Indian community" comes from two Supreme Court deci-
sions, United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), and United States v. McGowan, 302
U.S. 535 (1938). See F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 27-46. See, e.g., Moe v. Confed-
erated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 478-79 (1976); DeCoteau v. District County
Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
30. F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 38.
31. Id at 39.
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ence and boundaries of a dependent Indian community is often
difficult.
3. The Power To Exclude Non-Indians from Indian Country
The exclusionary power is a fundamental sovereign attribute that
is intimately tied to a tribe's ability to protect the integrity and order
of its territory and the welfare of its members.3 2 A tribe needs no
federal authorization to exercise sovereignty. 33 In Worcester v. Geor-
gia,34 the United States Supreme Court held that persons were allowed
to enter Cherokee land only "with the consent of the Cherokees
themselves."'35
More recently, in Montana v. United States,36 the Supreme Court
recognized that tribal powers extend to activities of non-members on
fee lands, but only if there is a tribal interest sufficient to justify regula-
tion.37 The Montana Court made clear that the mere presence of non-
Indians in Indian country is not sufficient to meet this tribal interest
32. Treaties affirm the existence of an exclusionary power by providing methods for
exclusion. See, e.g., Treaty with the Wiandots, Delawares, and Ottawas, Jan. 21, 1785, art.
5, 7 Stat. 17. Successive enactments of Trade and Intercourse Acts also evince congres-
sional concern with trespassers on Indian lands. See Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, § 5, 1
Stat. 330 (repealed by Act of May 19, 1796); Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, §§ 2, 3, 5, 1 Stat.
470 (expired by its own terms, 1799); Act of June 30, 1984, ch. 161, §§ 6, 9, 10, 11, 4 Stat.
730 (repealed in part, 1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 179, 180 (1982)). See Merrion v.
Jacirilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
33. See Quechan Tribe v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976); Ortiz-Barraza v. United
States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal
dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906).
34. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
35. Id. at 560; Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Powers of
Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. at 50 ("over all lands of the reservation, whether owned by
a tribe, by members thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the sovereign power of determin-
ing the conditions upon which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain, to reside
therein, and to do business.. . ."); see Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians in Civil Mat-
ters: Approval of Various Ordinances of the Crow and Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, Op.
Solic. Interior (Oct. 13, 1976) (unpublished, on file at the offices of the Cornell International
Law Journal). As with other tribal powers, the power to exclude is subject to limitation or
abolition by Congress. See supra text accompanying notes 10 & 16.
36. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
37. The Court stated:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee
lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activ-
ities of non-members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its mem-
bers through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-
Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe.
Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted). But see 25 C.F.R. § 170.8 (1984) (tribes must keep reser-
vation roads constructed with federal funds open).
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test.38
A tribe presumptively has an interest in activities on lands
belonging to the tribe or its members; thus, tribal control over Indian
lands can be the basis for extensive tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians
in civil matters.39 For activities on non-Indian land within Indian
country, however, tribal jurisdiction, including the power to exclude
non-members, is subject to the Montana test of tribal interest.4°
B. ALASKA NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY
1. Origins
The notion of Indian sovereignty rests on an assumption that
Indians once exercised political control over themselves and their
land.41 Some commentators argue that because Alaska Natives were
not originally grouped as tribes they are somehow different from Indi-
ans in other states.42 This distinction leads to the argument that the
absence of tribal organization implies an absence of political organiza-
tion.43 Before western contact, however, the traditional form of
38. In holding that the Crow tribe did not have jurisdiction over fishing by non-Indians
on non-Indian land within reservation boundaries, the Court found that the tribe was not
dependent on the reservation's fishery resources. Thus, the tribal interest was insufficient to
justify regulation of the non-Indians. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. But cf Buster v. Wright,
135 F. 947, 951 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906) (upholding tribal
business license fee imposed on non-Indians trading on the reservation even though they
owned the lots on which they conducted business: "[T]he jurisdiction to govern the
inhabitants of a country is not conditioned or limited by the title to the lands which they
occupy in it.. .... "), cited with approval in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Coleville Indian Res., 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980).
39. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
40. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. See Collins, Implied Limitations on the
Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1979); Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-
Indians in Civil Matters: Approval of Various Ordinances of the Crow and Shoshone-
Bannock Tribes, Op. Solic. Interior (Oct. 13, 1976) (unpublished, on file at the offices of the
Cornell International Law Journal). No court has explicitly ruled on the power to exclude
from Indian country absent some minimum Indian-owned or trust-held land base; no court
has explicitly ruled on the power of an Indian sovereign to exclude non-members from a
dependent Indian community qualifying as Indian country. Cf Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (authority of a state to regulate tribal activities off an Indian
reservation is broader than its authority over tribal activities on a reservation)."' Uphold-
ing the New Mexico gross receipts tax, the Mescalero Apache Court stated, "But tribal
activities conducted outside the reservation present different considerations. 'State author-
ity over Indians is yet more extensive over activities. . . not on any reservation.'" Id. at
148 (quoting Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962)).
41. See, ag., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977). In upholding the consti-
tutionality of the Major Crimes Act from equal protection challenges, the Court stated that
federal regulation of Indian affairs is "rooted in the unique status of Indians as 'a separate
people' with their own political institutions." Id. at 646.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 61-63. Because "tribes" of other states were not
always organized along the tribal lines later established by the federal government, see F.
COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 6, this distinction is inaccurate.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 61-63.
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Alaska Native government was the village.44 Through village govern-
ment, Alaska Natives exercised political control over themselves45 and
exercised a degree of sovereignty.
2. Federal Treatment of Alaska Natives and Its Implications for
Their Sovereignty
a. Early History
The first American reference to Alaska Natives in a legal docu-
ment is in Article III of the 1867 Russian-American Treaty of Ces-
sion.46 Article III permits the "inhabitants of the ceded territory,"
with the exception of the "uncivilized native tribes," either to return to
Russia or to become United States citizens. The uncivilized tribes
were to be subject to "such laws and regulations as the United States
may from time to time adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that
country." 47
The federal government avoided negotiating with Natives and did
not enter into treaties.48 It simply ignored Alaska Natives49 until the
Organic Act of 1884.50 In the early days of the Organic Act pro-
grams, the United States government distinguished its relationship
44. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 414 n.208 (1942) [hereinafter
cited as F. COHEN, 1942 ed.].
45. "Long before there was any Territory of Alaska, Indian communities in the Terri-
tory had their own system of government." Hearings on S. 2037 and SJ Res. 162 Before
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1948).
46. Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America, Mar.
30, 1867, United States-Russia, 15 Stat. 539, T.S. No. 301 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of
Cession].
47. Treaty of Cession, supra note 46, at art. III. A memorandum from William Seward
to the Cabinet states that "'Indians of Alaska are to be on the same footing as indigenous
Indians of lower 48.'" D. MILLER, ALASKA TREATY 71 (1981) (quoting memorandum).
Miller suggests that the civilized-uncivilized distinction may be of little importance. Only
200 of 26,000 Natives in 1870 were made citizens. Id. The "civilization" issue did become
important in naturalization and school attendance cases. In re Minook, 2 Alaska 200
(1904) (naturalization); David v. Sitka School Bd., 3 Alaska 481 (1908) (school attend-
ance). The civilized-uncivilized distinction, however, "was never used to deny the applica-
bility of Federal Indian law to Alaska Natives." D. Case, The Special Relationship of
Alaska Natives to the Federal Government: An Historical and Legal Analysis 2 (1978)
(published by the Alaska Native Foundation, Anchorage).
48. Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 154 (Alaska 1977) (citing F. COHEN, 1942 ed.,
supra note 44, at 405) ("even though the purchase of [the Alaska] territory occurred in
1867, four years before the termination of the Senate's power to ratify treaties with the
Indians, the government never attempted to enter into treaties with Alaska Natives").
49. The federal government may have ignored Native rights because the relationship
between Alaska Natives and the federal government began during a period of assimilation
following the development of most Indian law.
50. Alaska Organic Act of 1884, ch. 53, § 8, 23 Stat. 24 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 280(a) (1982)). The Organic Act of 1884 extends the federal mining laws to
Alaska and provides, "The Indians or other persons in said district shall not be disturbed in
the possession of any lands actually in their use or occupation or now claimed by them but
the terms under which such persons may acquire title to such lands is reserved for future
legislation by Congress." 23 Stat. at 26.
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with the Alaska Natives from its relationship with Indians in other
states.51 Alaska Natives were not served by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, but by the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Educa-
tion,52 and they were served "without reference to race."'5 3 As a
result, the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior concluded in
1894 that certain laws applicable to "Indians" and "Indian country"
did not apply to Alaska Natives.54 He implied that the status of
Alaska Natives was materially different from that of other aboriginal
American tribes.55
In Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan,56 Justice Frankfurter
described the origins of the differences between the federal-Indian rela-
tionship and the federal-Alaska Native relationship.
There were no Indian wars in Alaska, although on at least one occasion, there
were fears of an uprising. There was never an attempt in Alaska to isolate
Indians on reservations. Very few were ever created and the purpose of these,
in contrast to many in other states, was not to confine the Indians for the
protection of the white settlers, but to safeguard the Indians against
exploitation. 5
7
In Atkinson v. Haldane,5 8 the Supreme Court of Alaska also
observed differences. The court noted that distinctions were made
because the Alaska Natives were initially under Russian rule.59 The
court also remarked that the seemingly limitless physical resources of
the territory of Alaska minimized the white settlers' displacement of
Natives. 60
Indian law commentator Felix Cohen noted that Native villages
and communities in Alaska were not organized on tribal lines and that
the village, rather than the ethnological tribe, was the central unit of
government. 61 As a result, Alaska Native villages and communities
51. Alaska-Legal Status of Natives, 19 Pub. Lands Dec. 323 (1894).
52. Through the efforts of Sheldon Jackson, the resources of the Department of the
Interior's Bureau of Education were focused on education of Alaska Natives. See D. Case,
supra note 47, at 2-3. In 1931, however, responsibility for the administration of Alaska
Native affairs was transferred to the Bureau of Indian Affairs from the Bureau of Educa-
tion. Id. at 3..
53. Alaska Organic Act, § 13, 23 Stat. 27 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 280 (a)).
54. Alaska-Legal Status of Natives, 19 Pub. Lands Dec. 323 (1894).
55. Id. at 324.
56. 369 U.S. 45 (1962).
57. Id. at 51.
58. 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977).
59. Id. at 154.
60. Id. The court went on to hold that the Metlakatla Indians, the subjects of this case,
were exceptions to an exception and should be treated like tribes of other states. Id. at 154-
55.
61. See F. COHEN, 1942 ed., supra note 44, at 414 n.208; Tlingit & Haida Indians v.
United States, 177 F. Supp. 452, 461 (Ct. Cl. 1959) ("Neither the Tlingit nor Haida Indians
were organized politically as tribes for the purpose of owning land or for any other pur-
pose."); In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327, 329 (D. Alaska 1886) (in rejecting Tlingit slavery, court
stated that Alaska "Indians' system of government is essentially patriarchial and not tri-
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apparently did not qualify as tribes, because they were included not as
"tribes" but as "identifiable Indian groups" in the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act of 193662 and the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946.63
There are indications, however, that the federal government's
relationship with Alaska Natives is analogous to its relationship with
Indians in other states. Recognizing that "aboriginal Natives. . . are
practically the only inhabitants of the Village of Tyonek," the Solicitor
for the Department of the Interior concluded in 1923 that the govern-
ment's relationship to the Tyonek Natives is in many respects identical
to its relationship with other American aboriginal peoples.6 The
Solicitor affirmed this position in 192465 and again in 1932.66 In 1942,
Felix Cohen stated that Alaska Natives occupy the same relation to
the federal government as do the Indians residing in the United
States. 67
Today, however, the federal government recognizes Alaska
Native governments for the purposes of certain federal programs but
does not recognize their sovereignty. In 1978, the Department of the
bal). See Hippler & Conn, The Village Council and Its Offspring: A Reform for Bush Jus-
tice, 5 UCLA-ALAsKA L. REv. 22 (1975).
62. Ch. 254, § 1, 49 Stat. 1250 (1936) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 473a (1982)). See infra
note 78, note 115 and accompanying text.
63. Ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (superceded by Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 89(a), 63
Stat. 102 (jurisdiction of claims after Aug. 13, 1946 in U.S. Court of Claims)). The Indian
Claims Commission Act established a special commission to hear and resolve claims
against the federal government. See Nelson Act of 1905, ch, 277, §§ 3-5, 33 Stat. 617.
64. "The relations existing between them and the government are very similar and in
many respects identical with those which have long existed between the government and
the aboriginal people residing within the territorial limits of the United States to whom I
shall refer as American Indians." 49 Pub. Lands Dec. 592, 592-93 (1923).
65. Status of the Natives of Alaska with Respect to the Title to Certain Tide Lands
Near Ketchiken, 50 Pub. Lands Dec. 315, 316 (1924).
66. In 1932, the Solicitor issued a comprehensive opinion reviewing the status of
Alaska Natives. He concluded a discussion of applicable cases, statutes, and policies as
follows:
From the foregoing it is clear that no distinction has been or can be made
between the Indians and other natives of Alaska so far as the laws and relations of
the United States are concerned whether the Eskimos and other natives are of
Indian origin or not as they are all wards of the Nation, and their status is in
material respects similar to that of the Indians of the United States. It follows that
the natives of Alaska, as referred to in the treaty of March 30, 1867, between the
United States and Russia, are entitled to the benefits of and are subject to the
general laws and regulations governing the Indians of the United States ....
Status of Alaska Natives, 53 Interior Dec. 593, 605-06 (1932); accord Nagle v. United
States, 191 F. 141, 142 (9th Cir. 1911).
67. The legal position of the individual Alaskan Natives has been generally assimi-
lated to that of the Indians of the United States. It is now substantially established
that they occupy the same relation to the Federal Government as do the Indians
residing in the United States; that they, their property, and their affairs are under
the protection of the Federal Government; that Congress may enact such legisla-
tion as it deems fit for their benefit and protection; and that the laws of the United
States. . . proper are generally applicable to the Alaskan Natives.
F. COHEN, 1942 ed., supra note 44, at 404.
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Interior promulgated Procedures for Establishing that an American
Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe,68 under which the Secretary
of the Interior publishes annually a List of Indian Tribal Entities that
Have a Government-To-Government Relationship with the United
States.69 Placement on this list is a prerequisite to the protection, ser-
vices, benefits, immunities, and privileges available to federally
acknowledged Indian tribes. Alaska Native groups are listed as
"Native Governmental Entities; '70 this listing allows Alaska Natives
to receive federal benefits but explicitly does not recognize their sover-
eign status.71
b. Impact of ANCSA
ANCSA created confusion about the permissible scope of Alaska
Native sovereignty. 72 The Act modified the federal relationship with
68. 43 Fed. Reg. 39,361 (1978) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 83 (1984)).
69. This list comprises "all Indian tribes which are recognized and receiving services
from the Bureau of Indian Affairs." 25 C.F.R. § 83.6(b) (1984).
70. 47 Fed. Reg. 53,133 (1982). See Affidavit of Theodore C. Krenzke, Director, Office
of Indian Services, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 14 (September 28, 1983) (on file at the offices
of the Cornell International Law Journal) (drafted for the NVT v. Puckett suit, but not
submitted to the court) ("The Department [of the Interior] considers the Native Village of
Tyonek to be a Native governmental entity based on the village's organization pursuant to
Federal statute and a long-standing course of dealing with the Village as a Native govern-
mental entity."); Board of Equal. v. Alaska Native Bhd. & Sisterhood, 666 P.2d 1015, 1024
n.2 (Alaska 1983) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring) ("This listing [47 Fed. Reg. 53,133] ...
expressly avoided characterizing Alaskan Native groups as tribes or Indian communities.
Instead, the notice stated that 'unique circumstances have made eligible additional entities
in Alaska which are not historical tribes.' ").
71. The Department of the Treasury uses the same list of Alaska Native Entities to
identify those groups of Alaska Natives qualifying for favorable tax treatment under the
Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1982)). See Rev. Proc. 83-87, § 4, 1983-50
I.R.B. 6-16. The Act provides,
(A) IN GENERAL. The term "Indian tribal government"means the governing
body of any tribe, band, community, village, or group of Indians, or (if applicable)
Alaska Natives, which is determined by the Secretary [of the Treasury], after con-
sultation with the Secretary of the Interior, to exercise governmental functions.
(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR ALASKA NATIVES. No determination under Subpara-
graph (A) with respect to Alaska Natives shall grant or defer any status or powers
other than those enumerated in section 7871. Nothing in the Indian Tribal Gov-
ernmental Tax Status Act of 1982, or in the amendments made thereby, shall vali-
date or invalidate any claim by Alaska Natives of sovereign authority over lands or
people.
26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(40) (1982).
72. For example, the village of Venetie unilaterally asserted title to lands beyond its
ANCSA entitlement and passed an ordinance requiring non-tribal members to procure a
"license to trespass" with the condition that non-members may be allowed to construct
private homes or businesses but will have no claim to the structures or to the land upon
which they sit. In addition, business licenses will be subject to a five-percent gross receipts
tax. Alaska Native News, Aug. 1983, at 40. Village officials in Akiachak have attempted
to dissolve their city council in favor of a tribal government. As a result, the status of over
haifa million dollars in state funds is in doubt. The Anchorage Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at A-
1. Both the towns of Arctic Village and Venetie assert that since they are federally recog-
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Alaska Natives in ways that are inconsistent with the power of Native
villages to exclude non-Natives; ANCSA severed Native land owner-
ship from Native government and vested that land in corporations and
individual shareholders. 73 The impact of ANCSA on Alaska Native
communities is significant in that it
1. expresses a policy against creating reservations, wardships, or racially
defined institutions;
2. terminates all hunting and fishing rights;
3. unilaterally revokes all reservations except Metlakatla; and
4. provides for state taxation of Native lands after 1991.
The Act in effect, de-emphasizes the role of Native village Governments by
preventing their ownership or control of any substantial portion of the 40 mil-
lion acre settlement.74
Thus, although ANCSA is consistent with Alaska Native sovereignty,
it is inconsistent with the exercise of the power to exclude non-Natives
because it severs Alaska Native land ownership from Alaska Native
government.75
nized governments, state taxes and regulations do not apply to resource development on
tribal lands, including production of oil and gas and regulation of hunting and fishing.
Alaskan Native News, Aug. 1983, at 7, 40.
In support of these kinds of local actions, the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN)
recently urged villages "to consider the possibility of protecting native land-holdings by
transferring them to a tribal government." The Anchorage Times, Oct. 23, 1983, at A-8,
col. 5. Further, the newly-formed United Tribes of Alaska, which represents Alaska village
governments that are attempting to assert political power, recently voted to seek Non-
Governmental Organization Status within the United Nations. Tundra Times, Oct. 26,
1983, at 23, col. 1.
73. ANCSA extinguished all claims based on "aboriginal right, title, use, or occupancy
of land or water areas in Alaska." 43 U.S.C. § 1603(c) (1982). In return, the United States
segregated $462,500,000 from general Treasury funds into a separate Alaska Native Fund.
Id at § 1605(a)(1). An additional amount not to exceed $500,000,000 was to be deposited
into the Fund from mineral royalties. Id. at § 1608(g). Alaska was divided into twelve
geographic regions, each with its own for-profit Regional Corporation. Id. at § 1606(a),
(d). A thirteenth Regional Corporation-for Alaska Natives who are not residents of Alaska
was organized in 1976. Id. at § 1606(c). Pub. L. No. 94-204, § 8, 89 Stat. 1149 (1976)
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1604(c) (1982)); Alaska Native Ass'n of Or. v. Morton, 417 F.
Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1974). Within each Regional Corporation Village Corporations were
established. 43 U.S.C. § 1607. The Regional Corporations were to supervise distribution
of funds to Village Corporations and individual shareholders. Id at § 1606(j)-(m). Alaska
Natives also received over 40 million acres of land, selected in part by the Village Corpora-
tions and in part by the Regional Corporations. Fee simple patents for the land were issued
to the corporations. See F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 746-47, 753-54. ANCSA
does not restrict alienation of land; however, stock in the Native corporations is alienable
after 1991. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h).
74. L Price, supra note 26, at 69-70 (citing AMERICAN INDIAN POL'Y REVIEW
COMM'N, 95TH CONG., lsT SEss., FINAL REPORT, vol. 2, at 679 (Comm. Print 1977)).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 170-78.
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II
NATIVE VILLAGE OF TYONEK v. PUCKETT
A. NATIVE VILLAGE OF TYONEK V. PUCKETT
Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett 76 offers an opportunity to test
the efficacy of the tribe-Indian country analysis. The case presents an
issue of first impression: whether the Native Village of Tyonek
(NVT), 77 organized under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),78 but
whose reservation lands were revoked by ANCSA,79 can enforce an
ordinance excluding non-Natives from Tyonek. 80
1. History of NVT
In 1915, President Woodrow Wilson established the Moquawkie
Indian Reserve, setting aside 26,918 acres for the benefit of Alaska
Natives of the Tyonek region.81 In 1939, the Native Village of Tyonek
76. No. A82-369 (D. Alaska filed Sept. 26, 1982).
77. The village of Tyonek is located approximately 50 miles west across Cook Inlet
from Anchorage, Alaska. It is accessible only by air and has a population of approximately
250 people. Alaska Natives have inhabited the area since before European contact. Memo-
randum in Support of Motion to Strike Affirmative Defense of Plaintiff for Sovereign
Immunity at 3-4, Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, No. A82-369 (D. Alaska) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Memorandum in Support of Motidn to Strike]. When the United States
purchased Alaska from Russia, Tyonek was an Athabascan Indian community. Treaty of
Cession, supra note 47, 15 Stat. 539.
78. 25 U.S.C. § 473a (1982). The Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of
1934, ch. 576, § 7, 48 Stat. 986 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982)) was
an attempt to encourage economic development, self-determination, cultural plurality, and
a revival of tribalism. It enables "any tribe or tribes residing in the same reservation to
organize in order to provide a mechanism for the tribe as a governmental unit to interact
with and adapt to a modem society, rather than to force the assimilation of individual
Indians." Id See F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 149-50. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 113-16.
The major provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 were made fully applica-
ble to Alaska in 1936. Act of May 1, 1936, ch. 254, § 1, 49 Stat. 1250 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 473a (1982)). Before 1936, the tribal prerequisite of the 1934 Act made the
Act inapplicable to Alaska Natives, with their typical village form of self-government. See
infra note 115 and accompanying text. Today, the Native community sees IRA organiza-
tions as institutions for the exercise of sovereign powers in the event a local village govern-
ment or Alaska Native corporation would fall under non-Native control or influence.
Thus, the continuing vitality of IRA governments is an important concern.
79. ANCSA revoked all reserves set aside for Native use except the Annette Island
Reserve for the Metlakatla Indian community. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a).
80. NVT adopted an ordinance in 1942 known as "Rule No. 4," which states,
Any white men except government men or outsider coming in is allow [sic] to stay
only 24 hrs. If weather permits them to go. And is not allowed to bring any
liquor. Article No. 4 have to be put up in posters. And anyone destroying these
papers will be subject to penalty. Twenty-five dollars fine if caught destroying the
poster.
Rules for Laws of Native Village of Tyonek (May 18, 1942), quoted in Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Behalf of Plaintiff
and Counterclaim Defendants at 4, Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, No. A82-369 (D.
Alaska).
81. Exec. Order No. 2141, Feb. 27, 1915.
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adopted a constitution, corporate charter, and bylaws 2 pursuant to
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1936.83
The Tyonek Constitution empowered members of NVT to choose
a form of government and to establish a governing body. The mem-
bers established a council, which is authorized to exercise the powers
of NVT.84 Under the Tyonek Constitution, the council may control
the use by members or non-members of any reserve set aside by the
federal government for the village. The NVT council is also empow-
ered to make rules to carry out the Constitution.85 The council
adopted Rule No. 4, which provides that non-members of NVT, with
the exception of government employees, are permitted to remain in the
village no longer than twenty-four hours, unless weather conditions
compel a longer stay.86 Upon petition and under special circum-
stances, the council can grant a variance.8 7
In 1963, in accordance with the Indian leasing laws, 88 the Secre-
tary of the Interior, with the consent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA), 9 granted an oil and gas lease on NVT reserve land.90 The
Secretary also placed the oil and gas proceeds in trust funds for the use
and benefit of NVT.91 In 1965, NVT used part of the proceeds to
construct approximately sixty prefabricated houses for NVT members.
Before completion of the houses, NVT adopted the Family Plan,
which provided for the purchase of housing for NVT members.
Under the plan, title to all assets acquired by a family would vest in
82. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judg-
ment on Behalf of Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendants at 2, Native Village of Tyonek v.
Puckett, No. A82-369 (D. Alaska) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum in Support of Sum-
mary Judgment].
83. 25 U.S.C. § 473a (1982); see id. at §§ 476-477.
84. The council consists of a President, Vice President, Secretary/Treasurer, and six
other members elected to three year terms at staggered intervals. The council is vested
with executive, legislative, and judicial power subject to the direction and review of the
NVT membership. Affidavit of Donald Standifer, President Tyonek Village Council, NVT,
at 2, Exhibit A to Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 82.
85. Council powers also include "[doing] all things for the common good [of NVT
members]"; keeping "order in the reserve"; and guarding and fostering "native life, arts,
and possessions and native customs." NVT Const. art. IV, quoted in Memorandum in
Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 82 at 2-3.
86. Rules for Laws of Native Village of Tyonek (May 18, 1942) quoted in Memoran-
dum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 82, at 4. See supra note 80.
87. Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 82, at 4.
88. 25 U.S.C. § 398a (1982).
89. The Stanton Act, ch. 115, 42 Stat. 208 (1921) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1982)), authorizes the Bureau of Indian Affairs to expend funds appropriated by Con-
gress "for the benefit, care and assistance of the Indians throughout the United States."
90. Oil and Gas Leasing on Lands Withdrawn by Executive Order for Indian Purposes
in Alaska, 70 Interior Dec. 166 (1963).
91. 25 U.S.C. § 398b (1982).
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that family.92 In an attempt to regulate the alienation of Family Plan
housing, NVT passed an ordinance providing that Family Plan hous-
ing could not be sold, conveyed, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise alien-
ated to non-NVT members. 93
On December 18, 1971, ANCSA revoked the Moquawkie Indian
Reserve.94 The land that was previously included in the reserve is now
owned by the Tyonek Village Corporation, an ANCSA profit-making
Native corporation subject to Alaska law.95 ANCSA thus leaves the
NVT government landless, without an Indian reservation.
2. Litigation
In October 1981, non-members96 Donald and Erna Puckett
leased a Family Plan house from member Esther Kaloa.97 Two
months later, non-members Fred and Virginia Slawson unsuccessfully
sought permission from the village council to reside in the village.98
On May 29, 1982, the Slawsons leased a Family Plan house from
92. See Ollestead v. Native Village of Tyonek, 560 P.2d 31 (Alaska 1977), and
Fondahn v. Native Village of Tyonek, 450 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1971), for a recitation of this
history. See Affidavit of Donald Standifer, supra note 84, at 8.
93. Village Ordinance No. 65-32 provides,
The interests of members of the Village in houses which are acquired. . . by virtue
of the Family Plan of the Village cannot be sold, conveyed, leased, mortgaged, or
otherwise alienated by any member of the Village to a person, corporation or other
legal entity which or who is not an enrolled member of the Village of Tyonek,
Alaska. It is the purpose of this resolution to insure that private interests in houses
in the Village or in the Moquawkie reservation may only be held by enrolled mem-
bers of the Village of Tyonek. Should any alienation be attempted in violation of
this resolution the same shall be void.
Village of Tyonek, Alaska, Ordinance No. 65-35, quoted in Memorandum in Support of
Summary Judgment, supra note 82, at 17. "On July 1, 1981 the council adopted ordinance
No. 8 1-1, amending resolution No. 65-32 to prohibit non-members of the NVT from inher-
iting, either by testamentary disposition or intestate succession, any interest in houses con-
structed under the Family Plan." Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra
note 82, at 17.
94. 43 U.S.C. § 1618 (1982).
95. Tyonek Village Corporation was formed pursuant to section 8 of ANCSA, 43
U.S.C. § 1607 (1982). It is a legal entity distinct from the Native Village of Tyonek. It
holds title to the lands of the former Moquawkie Indian Reservation, as well as additional
lands. Nearly all the Corporation's initially enrolled shareholders were NVT members.
Affidavit of B. Agnes Brown, President of Tyonek Village Corporation, Native Village of
Tyonek v. Puckett, No. A82-369 (D. Alaska).
96. The IRA authorized the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a final roll of Tyonek
membership, 25 U.S.C. § 163 (1982), and on May 31, 1965, the Secretary approved the
Tyonek membership rolls. See Ollestead v. Native Village of Tyonek, 560 P.2d 31, 33
(Alaska 1977).
97. The Pucketts leased the Kaloa house from October 10, 1981, to June 15, 1982. In
April 1982, the parties amended the lease agreement to renew it for one year, ending April
15, 1983. At the same time, the parties agreed in writing to the following condition:
"Should the Native Village of Tyonek, by act of the council, vote to remove lessees, by
court action, this lease is automatically voided." Memorandum in Support of Summary
Judgment, supra note 82, at 19.
98. Id. at 20.
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members Alec and Olga Constantine.9 On June 2, 1982, the Slawsons
made a second request to remain in the village, but NVT again denied
it.100
In August 1982, NVT brought an action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Alaska01x against the Pucketts, Slaw-
sons, Kaloas, and Constantines, requesting an order evicting the non-
member defendants and an order enjoining the member defendants
from leasing or otherwise alienating the premises to the non-member
defendants. 102 NVT argues that in excluding non-Natives from
Tyonek, it has acted as a "federally recognized" tribe exercising pow-
ers of self-government pursuant to its inherent authority, constitution,
and bylaws.10 3 NVT contends that the village is a dependent Indian
community; therefore, it falls within the federal definition of Indian
country. 104 Thus, it passes the tribe-Indian country analysis and is
free to exercise the inherent powers of an Indian sovereign and exclude
non-Natives from its village. NVT also argues that its exercise of
those powers is valid, because the exclusion of non-Natives from
Tyonek serves to protect the social and internal relations of the mem-
bers of NVT and to promote the social, political, and economic integ-
rity of Tyonek as an Indian community. 10 5
The defendants and cross-plaintiffs argue that NVT does not
overcome the tribe-Indian country hurdles and that even if it does, its
power to exclude non-Natives from Tyonek is limited by the United
States Constitution and federal statutes.10 6 Although the court could
decide Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett on a number of bases, 10 7 the
case squarely presents the question of the vitality of an Alaskan IRA
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Native Village ofTyonek v. Puckett, No. A82-369 (D. Alaska filed Sept. 26, 1982).
102. Amended Complaint at 4, Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, No. A82-369 (D.
Alaska).
103. Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 82, at 22.
104. Id.
105. Ia
106. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendants at 1, Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, No. A82-369 (D. Alaska). The
defendants argue that the ordinance is racially discriminatory and thus violates the Equal
Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act. Id at 12-15.
107. The court could find, assuming arguendo, that NVT is a sovereign, that the ordi-
nance must fall nonetheless because (1) in light of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1303 (1982), NVT does not have the authority to pass racially discriminating ordi-
nances; (2) the federal constitution and statutory guarantees prohibit racially discrimina-
tory ordinances; (3) ANCSA, by extinguishing all aboriginal claims and all permanent
racially defined institutions or lengthy federal wardships, extinguished NVT's right to
exclude non-Indians; (4) 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982) (state civil jurisdiction of actions to which
Indians are parties) and 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1982) (state criminal jurisdiction of offenses
committed by or against Indians) withdrew NVT's power to enact regulatory ordinances;
or (5) the power to exclude from fee lands requires some minimum Indian-owned or trust-
held land base. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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government after ANCSA and provides an opportunity to expose the
weaknesses of the tribe-Indian country analysis.
B. APPLYING THE TRADITIONAL TRIBE-INDIAN COUNTRY TEST
Traditional analysis requires that a Native government be a
"tribe" located in "Indian country"'' 08 in order to exclude non-Natives
from a village. The following discussion examines NVT's ability to
meet these requirements.
1. NVTs Tribal Status
There is no single definition or test for tribal status. 10 9 Tribes
generally are recognized by either the executive or legislative branches
of the federal government. The judiciary usually will defer to this
determination.1 10 Neither Congress nor the Executive has recognized
NVT as a tribe, although the federal government's relationship with
NVT is similar to its relationship with recognized tribes.' Moreover,
NVT does not fit the judicial definition of "tribe."' "12 Thus, although
NVT might be considered a tribe for some purposes, it is not a "tribe"
under traditional tests for establishing sovereignty.
a. Legislative Treatment of NVT
NVT was formed pursuant to the IRA of 1936; 113 its goal was to
encourage self-determination for Indians." 4 Nonetheless, although
NVT is an IRA government, it is not necessarily a sovereign with the
power to exclude non-members from Tyonek.
When the IRA was enacted in 1934, it applied only in part to
Alaska Natives. Because of difficulties in applying the term "tribe" to
108. See supra text accompanying notes 19-40.
109. See supra note 1, text accompanying notes 22-25.
110. F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 3. Courts have even characterized tribal
existence as a political question not appropriate for judicial determination. See Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215-18 & n.43 (1962); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913)
(quoting United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407,419 (1865)); Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). See generally Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doc-
trine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71-79
(1978). One could argue that the Executive Branch, through the Department of the Inte-
rior, has classified NVT as an entity rather than as a tribe and that the United States
District Court of Alaska should defer to that administrative judgment rejecting tribal clas-
sification for Alaska Native groups. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 119-23.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 124-31.
113. 25 U.S.C. § 473a (1982). See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
114. See Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (concerning 1934 IRA, which was
extended to Alaska Natives in 1936); To Grant to Indians Living Under Federal Tutelage
the Freedom To Organize for Purposes of Local Self-Government and Economic Enterprise:
Hearings on S. 2755 and S. 3643 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934) (same).
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Alaska Natives and because the business corporations provisions did
not apply to Alaska, Congress amended the Act in 1936 to extend
more of its provisions to Alaska:
[G]roups of Indians in Alaska not heretofore recognized as bands or tribes, but
having a common bond of occupation, or association, or residence within a
well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district, may organize to
adopt constitutions and bylaws and to receive charters of incorporation and
Federal loans under sections 16, 17, and 10 of the Act of June 18, 1934 (43Stat. 984).1 15
Because NVT was formed under the "common bond" requirement of
the 1936 Act, it may not be entitled to the sovereign status of govern-
ments that were formed under the tribal requirements of the 1934
Act.11 6
b. Executive Treatment of NVT
The executive branch also treats NVT as if it were a tribe 17 but
has never explicitly recognized NVT as a tribe. An Opinion of the
Solicitor held that an Indian group that is not an historical tribe may
not list in its constitution the sovereign powers of a tribe." 8 Many
federal regulations define "tribe" to include Alaska Native villages
such as NVT. These regulations use the term broadly to identify eligi-
ble recipients of support, protection, and assistance,' 19 but they do not
115. Act of May 1, 1936, ch. 254, § 1, 49 Stat. 1250 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 473a
(1982)).
116. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
117. The Secretary of the Interior is required by federal regulation to publish a "list of
all Indian tribes which are recognized and receiving services from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs." 25 C.F.R. § 83.6(b) (1984). The list "shall be updated and published annually in
the Federal Register." Id. The Secretary of the Interior has not published a list of Alaskan
entities considered tribes. The Department, however, has listed Alaska Native Villages,
including Tyonek, as "entities" eligible to receive BIA services and not "tribes." 47 Fed.
Reg. 53,133 (1982). An argument can be made, however, that the passage of ANCSA was
itself a legislative recognition of tribal status and sovereignty as well as a settlement of a
property claim.
118. Powers of an Indian Group Organized Under IRA But Not as Historical Tribes, 1
Op. Solic. Interior 813 (April 15, 1938) (concerning non-Alaska Indians). The Department
of the Interior has not taken a position on this issue but is expected to in the near future.
R. Price, supra note 26, at 75.
119. See, eg., 25 C.F.R. § 256.2(0(2) (1984) (implementing the Snyder Act); id. at
§ 23.2(i) (implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act); id. at §§ 32.2(c), 32.2(d), 32.3
(implementing title XI of the Education Amendments of 1978); id at § 41.3(i) (implement-
ing the Tribally Controlled Community College Assistance Act); id at §§ 101.1(e)-(g),
103.1(e)-(g), 286.1(g)-(i) (implementing the Indian Financing Act); id at §§ 271.2(h),
274.3(j), 275.2(0, 276.2(i), 277.3(g) (implementing the Indian Self-Determination and Edu-
cation Assistance Act). These regulations concern extension of benefits to Natives and
sweep as broadly as possible to effectuate the ameliorative purposes of the legislation. See
Alaska Chapter, Assoc'd Gen. Contractors v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982) (adopt-
ing broad definitions of Indian Self-Determination and Education Act to HUD regula-
tions); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (restrictive application of definitional language
is improper when construing either the grant or denial of general assistance benefits to
Indians).
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explicitly grant sovereignty or address the implications of their use of
the label "tribe" for the group's sovereignty.
Although the Department of the Interior recognizes that it has a
government-to-government relationship with NVT, it refers to NVT
as a Native Governmental Entity rather than as a tribe. 120 In 1981,
the Bureau of Indian Affairs promulgated regulations for tribal elec-
tions under the IRA, specifically including Alaska elections under the
IRA of 1936121 and suggesting that IRA governments in Alaska
would have the same powers as tribal governments in other states. 122
Nonetheless, the Bureau of Indian Affairs lists Alaska Native groups
separately from tribes, implying that the two are distinct. 23
c. NVT's Status Under the Judicial Definition of Tribe
Although two courts assumed without deciding that NVT was a
tribe, 124 it seems clear that NVT is not a tribe under the definition
120. See supra notes 68-71 & 117 and accompanying text.
121. 25 C.F.R. § 81.1(w) (1984).
"Tribe" means: (1) Any Indian entity that has not voted to exclude itself from
the Indian Reorganization Act and is included, or is eligible to be included, among
those tribes, bands, pueblos, groups, communities, or Alaska Native entities listed
in the FEDERAL REGISTER pursuant to 83.6(b) of this chapter as recognized and
receiving services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs ....
Id
122. On equal protection grounds, the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Alaska recently initi-
ated an action to organize Alaska Native villages under the Indian Reorganization Act.
There are approximately 30 villages that have applications for tribal constitutions pending
with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. See R. Price, supra note 26, at 76.
123. Under the canon of statutory construction noscitur a sociis ("associated words"), if
Alaska Native groups are listed as entities, separate from tribes, they must be distinct from
tribes. See C. SANDS, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.16 (4th ed.
1972).
124. Fondaln v. Native Village of Tyonek, 450 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1971); Ollestead v.
Native Village of Tyonek, 560 P.2d 31 (Alaska 1977). The Fondahn and Ollestead opinions
assume Tyonek's tribal status for purposes of decision; they do not expressly recognize
NVT as a tribe. In Fondahn, the Ninth Circuit recited the history of Tyonek from the
creation of the Moquawkie Reserve to 1971. 450 F.2d at 521. The court stated that the
United States recognized the council of Tyonek as a spokesperson for the people of Tyonek
in lieu of any local government. Id. But with regard to NVT's tribal status, the court only
noted that the plaintiff, an alleged member-participant in the distribution of revenue from
the oil and gas lease, had alleged that Tyonek village had been known as the Moquawkie,
Tyonek, and Beluga tribe. Id. There was no need for the court to address NVT's tribal
status. The court apparently assumed that the Indians at Tyonek were a tribe and went on
to adopt the holding of Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe of S. Ute Res., 249 F.2d at 920,
that "a tribe has the complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership,
as a political entity. . . ." 450 F.2d at 522 (quoting Martinei, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th
Cir. 1957)).
In Ollestead, 560 P.2d 31 (Alaska 1977), appellants sought a declaratory judgment that
they were entitled to share in proceeds from certain oil and gas leases. The proceeds were
to be for the use and benefit of members of the Tyonek tribe. 560 P.2d at 33. The superior
court dismissed the action, relying on Fondahn and Martinez. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Alaska affirmed the judgment below on the grounds that 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b)
deprives state courts of jurisdiction over ownership disputes involving property belonging
to an Indian tribe or community and held in trust by the United States. Id. at 34. In
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given by the United States Supreme Court in Montoya v. United States.
"By a 'tribe' we understand a body of Indians of the same or similar
race, united in a community under one leadership or government, and
inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory." 125
This definition provides a four part test: a) same or similar race;
b) united in a community; c) under one leadership or government; and
d) inhabiting a particular territory.
NVT does not pass the Montoya test. NVT fails the first part, 126
because membership is open to any Alaska Native who is one-fourth
Athabascan, Eskimo, or Aleut.127 With respect to the second and
third parts, many courts128 and Solicitor's Opinions1 29 have required
Indians to have been historically united in a community under one
leadership or government. NVT is an IRA government formed under
the common bond requirement of the 1936 Act; but IRA status alone
does not establish historical tribal existence.130 Finally, under the
fourth part, although most NVT members inhabit the Tyonek area,
some live elsewhere. Thus, NVT fulfills none of the Montoya criteria
completely.131
applying 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b), the Alaska Supreme Court assumed that the Tyonek Indians
constituted a tribe or community.
For recognition of other Alaska entities, see Board of Equal. v. Alaska Native Bhd. &
Sisterhood, 666 P.2d 1015, 1022 (Alaska 1983); Inupiat Community of Arctic v. Alaska,
548 F. Supp. 183, 187-88 (D. Alaska 1982); In re Angus, 60 Or. App. 546, - n.9, 655 P.2d
208, 212 n.9 (1982), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 107 (1983); Cogo v. Central Council of Tlingit
& Haida Indians, 465 F. Supp. 1286, 1288 (D. Alaska 1979); Johnson v. Chilkat Indian
Village, 457 F. Supp. 384, 387 (D. Alaska 1978).
125. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
126. Cf Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, supra note 77, at 6.
127. Such broad membership parameters may reflect the nature of the traditional village
government in Alaska. Furthermore, they parallel the federally reorganized tribes whose
members are combinations of ethnological tribes. Congress has created "consolidated" or
"confederated" tribes consisting of several ethnological tribes. See, e.g., United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 546 (1975) (Wind River Reservation consisting of Shoshone and
Arapahoe tribes).
128. See, eg., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913); Mashpee Tribe v. New
Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); United States v.
Washington, 476 F. Supp. 2101 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
129. See, eg., Status of St. Croix Chippewas, 1 Op. Solic. Interior 724 (Feb. 8 1937);
Keetowah-Organization as Band, 1 Op. Solic. Interior, 774 (July 29, 1937).
130. See supra notes 46-67 & 117 and accompanying text.
131. However, as the First Circuit noted, the basic Montoya test is "far from satisfac-
tory." Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 582 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 866 (1979). The Mashpee court also recognized that there are limits to Congress'
authority over Indians as tribes.
[T]hough the scope of congressional power to deal with Indians is very broad, it is
not unlimited. Congress cannot deal with Indians solely as a racial group ...
Nor can Congress arbitrarily label a group of people a tribe. . . .A tribe must be
something more than a private, voluntary organization.
592 F.2d at 582 n.3 (citations omitted). For an alternative to the Montoya test, see Note,
Tribal Status and the Indian Nonintercourse Act: An Alternative to the Montoya Definition
of Tribe, 29 CATH. U.L. REv. 625 (1980).
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2. Indian Country at Tyonek
With one exception, 132 cases decided before ANCSA indicated
that there was no Indian country in Alaska. 133 ANCSA revoked the
132. In In re McCord, 151 F. Supp. 132 (D. Alaska 1957), the court held that territorial
criminal laws did not apply to the Moquawkie Reserve because it was Indian country. In
response to McCord, Congress immediately enacted legislation to extend state civil and
criminal jurisdiction to "all Indian country in the [Alaska] territory." Act of August 8,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-1322; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982)). The legislative history shows that before McCord
the federal government and territorial government did not consider any part of Alaska to
be Indian country. S. REP. No. 1872, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3347-49. See generally R. Price, supra note 26, at 97-98.
133. Early decisions held that the Territory of Alaska was not Indian country for the
purpose of certain federal statutes. For example, United States v. Sevelofi, 27 F. Cas. 1021
(D. Or. 1872) (No. 16,252), dismissed an indictment against a defendant who allegedly
introduced whiskey into Sitka. The court reasoned that the Indian Non-Intercourse Act of
1834 was not applicable to Alaska.
In In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327 (D. Alaska 1886), the court addressed the question of
Indian country in a slave's petition for habeas corpus. The court held that an 1873 statute,
which extended two provisions of the 1834 Non-Intercourse Act, did not recognize Alaska
as Indian country for any other purpose; that groups of Alaska Natives were not tribes in
the legal sense; and that the thirteenth amendment, which prohibited slavery, applies to
them. It was not necessary, however, for the court to reach the Indian country issue,
because the thirteenth amendment is an absolute ban on slavery in the whole United States.
See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-39 (1968). The territory of Alaska
had been incorporated into the United States; thus, constitutional protections were applica-
ble. See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
In United States v. Booth, 161 F. Supp. 269 (D. Alaska 1958), the court held that the
Metlakatla Reserve was not Indian country. But cf Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151
(Alaska 1977) (Metlakatla Indian Community entitled to sovereign immunity just as
Indian tribes in other states). The Booth court distinguished the Metlakatla Indians by
their relatively high degree of assimilation into non-Native society; on the unique origin of
the reserve as a settlement for Native immigrants from Canada and certain Alaska Natives;
and on a finding that, in spite of organization under the Indian Reorganization Act, there
was no real tribal organization. In dicta, the court concluded that "none of the Indians of
Southeast Alaska. . . are within the definition of Indian country." Id. at 275. The deci-
sion relied heavily on an earlier territorial decision, United States v. Libby, McNeil &
Libby, 107 F. Supp. 697 (D. Alaska 1952), holding that the Hydaburg Indian Reservation
had not been established properly and reflecting a feeling that reservations in Alaska are
"indefensible" and constitute racial segregation and discrimination in the worst form. 161
F. Supp. at 272 (quoting United States v. Libby, McNeil & Libby, 107 F. Supp. at 699).
In Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961), the court com-
mented on the issue of dependent Indian communities, but expressly rejected the applicabil-
ity of the dependent Indian community category of Indian country, as expressed in
Sandoval, in the circumstances and history of Alaska. The court stated, "There is not now
and never has been an area of Alaska recognized as Indian country with one possible excep-
tion. See Petition of McCord. . . . This case stands alone in the area of Alaska law and
has been distinguished in United States v. Booth." Id. at 920 (citations omitted).
More recently, in 1979, the United States District Court for the District of Alaska con-
sidered the question of Indian country in Alaska in People of S. Naknek v. Bristol Bay
Borough, but stated that it did not have to decide whether the Village of South Naknek was
within Indian country. 466 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Alaska 1979). The court indicated that
the lots in question were "off reservation" and that this status made them subject to local
taxes for personal property. Id. The court cited Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369
U.S. 60 (1962) (Alaska may apply its anti-fish trap law to Native fishing outside an Indian
reservation), and Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (the state can tax
off-reservation Indians), in support of its decision. But see Bryan v. Itasca County, 426
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Moquawkie Reserve,134 but it did not expressly abolish Indian coun-
try. 135 No court has addressed whether the Tyonek area is Indian
country absent the Moquawkie Reserve.
If Tyonek is Indian country, it must be a dependent Indian com-
munity.' 36 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
developed a test for determining whether an area is a dependent
Indian community in United States v. South Dakota.137 The court set
out four factors for determining the status of a dependent Indian
community:
(1) the United States' retention of "title to the lands which it permits the Indi-
ans to occupy" and "authority to enact regulations and protective laws respect-
ing this territory". . . ; (2) "the nature of the area in question, the relationship
of the inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes and to the federal government,
and the established practice of government agencies toward the area"... ;
(3) [the existence of] "an element of cohesiveness ...manifested either by
economic pursuits in the area, common interests, or needs of inhabitants as
supplied by the locality". . . ; and (4) [the setting apart of] "such lands...
for the use, occupancy and protection of dependent Indian peoples". ...138
U.S. 373 (1976) (state taxes generally not applicable in Indian country); ANCSA, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1620(d) (1982) (ANCSA lands are exempt from real property taxes until 1991).
134. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1982). See supra note 73 and accompanying text, note 79.
135. No explicit language in ANCSA or in its legislative history refers to Indian coun-
try. "[The act did not. . . specifically abolish Indian countryper se. Therefore, unless the
continued existence of Indian country would be patently inconsistent with the purposes of
the act, no intent to abolish Indian country. . . should be read into the act." Opin. Assoc.
Solic., Div. of Indian Aff., Comm'n of Indian Aff., Dep't of Interior (October 1, 1980)
(unpublished), quoted in Price, supra note 26, at 101.
There are, however, provisions of ANCSA that indicate that it may be inconsistent with
dependent Indian community status. See, eg., 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d) (1982) (land grants are
to be conveyed to corporations organized under state law); id. at § 1611 (all lands selected
are patented in fee simple with few restrictions on alienation); id. at § 1620(d) (lands
granted under ANCSA are to be taxable in 20 years); id. at § 1613(e)(3) (municipalities
organized under state law are to receive municipal lands from ANCSA village corpora-
tions); id. at § 1601(b) (ANCSA settlement should be accomplished "without establishing
any permanent racially defined institutions."). These provisions indicate that Congress did
not intend to expand the notion of dependent Indian communities.
136. Congress defined Indian country to include land within an Indian reservation,
Indian allotment, or dependent Indian community, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982), and ANCSA
revoked the Moquawkie Reserve, 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1982). See supra notes 1, 27 & 73
and accompanying text. There is no allotment at Tyonek; thus, Tyonek can be Indian
country only if it is a dependent Indian community.
The definition of "dependent Indian community" in the statutory Indian country defini-
tion is based on the Supreme Court's construction of the term in United States v.
McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938) (lands established as colony are Indian country for pur-
poses of liquor laws), and United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (lands owned by
Pueblo Indian treated as Indian country). Although the general policies behind recogniz-
ing Indian country are discussed in both cases, the Court did not announce a method for
determining whether Indian country exists.
137. 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1980) (South Dakota has no jurisdiction over a housing
project that is a dependent Indian community because it is managed by an Indian tribe).
138. Id. at 839 (quoting Weddell v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211, 212-13 (8th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941 (1981)) (citations omitted).
Other federal courts have suggested similar tests. See United States v. Levesque, 681
F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971) (Rawah
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Application of these factors to NVT suggests that NVT may not
be a dependent Indian community. With regard to the first factor, the
United States has not retained title to land at Tyonek, title has trans-
ferred to a private, profit-making corporation, Tyonek Native Corpo-
ration. 139 The United States retains no authority over selected lands,
and ANCSA explicitly anticipates the termination of the wardship. 140
With regard to the second factor, ANCSA has changed the relation-
community on land owned by the Navajo tribe was Indian country). The Martine court
stated that the trial court had followed the proper approach in considering "the nature of
the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes and to
the federal government, and the established practice of government agencies toward the
area." 422 F.2d at 1023. The court further stated that its holding did not imply that there
was a dependent Indian community "wherever a group of Indians is found, e.g., in Los
Angeles" and continued, "The mere presence of a group of Indians in a particular area
would undoubtedly not suffice." Id. at 1024. See also Weddell v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d
211,213 (8th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 941 (1981) ("[I]t would be unwise to expand
the definition of dependent Indian community to include a locale merely because a small
segment of the population consists of Indians receiving various forms of assistance.");
United States v. Mound, 477 F. Supp. 156 (D.S.D. 1979) (upholding criminal jurisdiction
of federal district court under the Federal Major Crimes Act; area in which crime allegedly
occurred was dependent Indian community within the meaning of Indian country). In
explaining its decision, the Mound court stated
The crucial consideration here is "whether [the community has] been set apart for
the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples."
The test for determining what is a dependent Indian community must be a flexi-
ble one, not tied to any single talismanic standard such as percentage of Indian
occupants. . . . The needs of Indian people must necessarily change with the
years, and the method of supervision over them by the United States must change
accordingly.
Id at 160 (quoting Youngbear v. Brewer, 415 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Iowa 1976), aft'd, 549
F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1977). For a state court's discussion of dependent Indian community
status, see State v. Dana, 404 A.2d 551, 563-64 (Me. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1098
(1980). "Sandoval indicate[s] that when an Indian tribal community has 'Indian title,' a
right to occupy lands, which the federal government has undertaken to protect by assuming
fiduciary responsibilities, the dependency status of the Indian community thus acknowl-
edged and protected would be sufficient to establish 'dependency' within the meaning of
Section 1151(b)." Id at 562. See also C.M.G. v. State, 594 P.2d 798 (Okla. Crim. App.
1979) (held Chilocco Indian school, set apart for the use of Indians under the guidance of
the federal government, is a dependent Indian community); State v. Cutnose, 87 N.M. 307,
532 P.2d 896 (1974) (U.S. Public Health Service Hospital whose patients were largely Nav-
aho held not to be Indian country). See generally Lobsenz, Dependent Indian Communi-
ties. A Search for a Twentieth Century Definition, 24 ARiz. L. Rv. 1 (1982).
139. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-07 (1982).
140. [Ihe settlement should be accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in conformity
with the real economic and social needs of Natives, without litigation, with maxi-
mum participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights and property, with-
out establishing any permanent racially defined institutions, rights, privileges or
obligations, without creating a reservation system or lengthy wardship or trustee-
ship, and without adding to the categories of property and institutions enjoying
special tax privileges or to the legislation establishing special relationships between
the United States Government and the State of Alaska ....
43 U.S.C. § 1601(b).
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ship between the Tyonek Indians and the federal government. 141
ANCSA revoked the Moquawkie Reserve and replaced it with non-
trust lands owned and managed by a private, profit-making corpora-
tion that may not remain exclusively Indian. Without trust or tribal
lands, civil jurisdiction of Tyonek Indians over non-members is uncer-
tain.142 NVT meets the third requirement, cohesiveness, by virtue of
its status as an IRA government. It does not meet the fourth criterion;
the lands in question have not been set apart for the use, occupancy,
and protection of dependent peoples. ANCSA ensured this result by
revoking the Moquawkie Reserve. 143 The Tyonek Native Corporation
has selected the lands around Tyonek pursuant to ANCSA. Those
lands will be freely alienable according to the needs of the corpora-
tion.144 In summary, Tyonek satisfies only the cohesiveness factor of
the Eighth Circuit's test for dependent Indian community status.
The weight of authority strongly suggests that there is now no
Indian country at Tyonek. But, the Department of the Interior's fail-
ure to adopt a consistent position on the question of Indian country in
Alaska after ANCSA suggests that the question may still be open.145
141. "ANCSA reflects the new direction in federal Indian policy: it 'places on the
Natives alone the crucial task of translating the immediate benefits of the settlement into
permanent, socially and economically productive enterprises."' F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra
note 1, at 199 (quoting Lazarus & West, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: A
Flawed Victory, 40 LAw & CONTEMP. PRons. 134 (1976)).
142. NVT claims dependent Indian community status absent land ownership or trust
held lands. See supra notes 37 & 40 and accompanying text. But see Blatchford v. Gonza-
les, 670 P.2d 944 (N.M. 1983) (land held in fee simple by non-Indians and used as an
Indian trading post does not meet dependent Indian community test).
143. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a).
144. 43 U.S.C. § 1606. See supra note 73.
145. In an unpublished opinion, the Associate Solicitor for the Division of Indian
Affairs of the Department of the Interior concluded that the village townsite, Native allot-
ments, and land owned by the Native Village of Allakaket or Aalakaak's Corporation were
Indian country within the meaning of the Indian liquor laws.
The question of whether the Village of Allakaket qualified as a "dependent
Indian community" under current federal case law depends upon "the nature of
the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to Indian Tribes
and to the federal government, and the established practice of government agencies
toward the area." . . .
The village of Allakaket, having qualified for village land benefits under the Set-
tlement Act, is presumed not to be of "modem and urban character." 43 U.S.C.
§ 1610(b). Its recent inclusion in the LEAA "Determination of Eligible Alaska
Native Villages," listing those villages performing law enforcement functions
under state law, is evidence that the population is at least 70% Native. 45 Fed.
Reg. 46581 (July 10, 1980). The village is eligible to receive federal Indian services
available to Alaska Native villages. The lands at issue (other than Native allot-
ments, which are presumably Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c)), are the
village towasite and lands owned by the village or village corporation. In our view,
these factors are sufficient to support a presumption that the area is a dependent
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The federal government's ambivalence in this instance and others 146
may be seen as a tacit recognition that the traditional tribe-Indian
country approach is not an adequate tool for analysis of the sover-
eignty of Alaska Natives after ANCSA. IRA villages on land held by
ANCSA corporations are not tribes in Indian country within the
meaning of the traditional tests, but the federal government recognizes
that these villages deserve treatment similar to that of tribes in Indian
country in other states.
III
A PROPOSAL TO REPLACE THE TRADITONAL
TRIBE-INDIAN COUNTRY TEST WITH A
SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS
A. NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH
The traditional tribe-Indian country test fails to comprehend the
unique historical context and current posture of Alaska Natives; it is
not sufficient for analysis of Alaska Native sovereignty. The tradi-
tional test is formalistic 47 and fails to incorporate federal Indian pol-
Indian community and therefore Indian country for the purposes of the liquor
laws.
Opin. Assoc. Solic., Div. of Indian Aft., Comm'n of Indian Aff., Dep't of Interior (October
1, 1980) (unpublished) (citations and footnotes omitted), quoted in R. Price, supra note 26,
at 102-03.
The Associate Solicitor apparently decided that it was not necessary to distinguish
among the village townsites, Native allotments, and land granted to the Native Village of
Allakaket or the ANCSA corporation. The ANCSA lands, however, are not owned by the
Native Village of Allakaket but by the ANCSA corporation. No court or prior administra-
tor of the Department of the Interior had held that there is a dependent Indian community
on land not owned either by the United States or by a tribe. Department of Interior offi-
cials retreated in a United States Senate hearing. When asked whether the lands acquired
under ANCSA were considered to be Indian country, Associate Solicitor Walker
responded that he believed they are not. Mutual Agreements and Compacts Respecting
Jurisdiction and Government Operations: Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1981) (response of Hans Walker, Assoc. Solic.,
Div. of Indian Affairs).
On the other hand, in commenting on the definition of tribe in the Tribe-State Compact
Bill, the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs recommended that provision be made in the
definition of tribe for Indian country to exist in certain Alaska Native villages. R. Price,
supra note 26, at 106 (citing Letter from Assistant Secretary Ken L. Smith to Representa-
tive Morris K. Udall, Chairman, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs (April
21, 1982)). Thus, the Department of Interior has not yet adopted a consistent position on
Indian country in Alaska.
146. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
147. Tribe-Indian country criteria are easily misformulated and misapplied. As a result,
the terms "tribe" and "Indian country" become unduly strained, and courts are forced to
generate legal fictions to justify desired results. Because these formalistic criteria ignore the
underlying nature and purposes of the federal-Indian relationship, they risk undermining
the entire basis of Indian law. The tribe-Indian country analysis thus fails as a principled
method for recognizing limited sovereignty. Cf. McCoy, supra note 21, at 396 (courts have
formulated "oversimplified or mechanical generalizations concerning tribal-state and tri-
bal-federal relations.").
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icy as expressed by ANCSA. Application of the traditional test
requires heavy reliance on "authority reasons" and results in insuffi-
cient consideration of underlying substantive reasons.148
An appeal to authority is seldom an acceptable means of resolv-
ing a question of first impression.1 49 A court should not merely apply
authority; instead, it should extract the substantive reasons that
shaped the existing analogies and apply those reasons to the new situa-
tion.150 Two major substantive principles flow from the doctrine of
Indian sovereignty. These substantive principles can form the basis of
a test that is better suited than the traditional test to analysis of Alaska
Native sovereignty.
B. PROPOSED ANALYSIS
Natural rights theory and the primacy of federal power shape fed-
eral Indian policy. These two principles should be applied to analyze
Alaska Native sovereignty. An exercise of sovereignty should be per-
mitted if the group attempting to exercise sovereignty was originally a
self-governing group and if the particular exercise of sovereignty is not
limited by ANCSA or inherently inconsistent with the federal-Native
relationship created by ANCSA.
1. Natural Rights and Indian Sovereignty
Natural rights theory provides the substantive foundation for
U.S. recognition of Indian tribes as sovereigns.1 51 Early colonists and
conquerors recognized the aboriginal tribes as independent and self-
governing groups.152 According to sixteenth-century natural rights
theory, these groups had a right to be treated as sovereigns. 153 This
theory, and the consequent recognition of tribes as sovereigns, was
148. Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common-
Law Justification, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 730-35 (1978) (explaining the importance of
"substantive" reasons and the inadequacy of formalistic "authority" reasons). Professor
Summers might refer to the natural rights theories discussed below, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 151-58, as "rightness reasons" and the focus on federal policy as expressed in
ANCSA as a "goal reason." See id. at 735-75. Rightness reasons are reasons which
"always turn on the accordance of a decision with applicable norms of right action." Id. at
718 n.35 (emphasis omitted). "[A] rightness reason draws its force from the way in which
the decision accords with a sociomoral norm of rightness as applied to a party's actions or
to a state of affairs resulting from those actions." Id. at 718. "[A] goal reason. . . derives
its force from the fact that, at the time it is given, the decision it supports can be predicted
to have effects that serve a good social goal." Id. at 735.
149. Id. at 732.
150. Id.
151. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
152. See supra text accompanying note 8.
153. See F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 50-52.
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adopted by U.S. courts. 154
Groups of Alaska Natives that were originally self-governing
should be treated as sovereigns, even if their different history precludes
recognizing them as "tribes." Alaska Natives did not use the tribe as
their form of government; instead, the forms of Alaska Native govern-
ment varied from one group to the next, generally reflecting patterns
of food-gathering.15 5 Thus, government was on a village or commu-
nity level. 156 The substantive reason behind sovereignty-the natural
right to sovereignty of originally self-governing people-should deter-
mine whether a group is sovereign, not the legislative or executive
application of the "tribe" label.
2. Federal Power and Alaska Native Sovereignty
Although the sovereignty of tribes exists independent of federal
delegation, tribal powers are subject to important limitations nonethe-
less. "Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not with-
drawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status."1 57 The substantive reason behind the federal
limitation of Native sovereignty is the superior power of the United
States. The United States conquered Native governments and incor-
porated their territory into its boundaries. 158 As an external con-
queror, the United States acquired the power to limit exercises of
Native sovereignty. 59
ANCSA expresses current federal Indian policy on Alaska
Natives. 60 Thus, a court should decide whether the exercise of
Alaska Native sovereignty at issue is consistent with federal policy
toward Alaska Natives as expressed by ANCSA. An exercise of
Native sovereignty should be permitted unless it is explicitly limited
by ANCSA or inherently inconsistent with the federal-Native relation-
ship created by ANCSA.
C. APPLYING THE PROPOSED ANALYSIS TO NATIVE VILLAGE OF
TYONEK V. PUCKETT
According to the proposed analysis, an exercise of Alaska Native
sovereignty is valid if the group attempting to exercise sovereignty was
154. Cohen, supra note 7, at 17; see, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,
562-71 (1823) and authorities cited therein by plaintiffs and defendants.
155. See generally F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 750.
156. Id. at 750-57.
157. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). See Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1934); F.
Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REv. 145 (1940).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 10-18.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 10-18.
160. See F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 199.
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originally a self-governing group and if the particular exercise of sov-
ereignty is not explicitly limited by ANCSA or inherently inconsistent
with the federal-Native relationship created by ANCSA. Although
under this test NVT should be recognized as sovereign, NVT's exclu-
sionary ordinance is inherently inconsistent with the federal-native
relationship created by ANCSA. Thus, NVT should not be permitted
to exclude non-Natives from the village.
1. NVT as an Originally Self-Governing Group
If NVT can demonstrate that it was originally self-governing, it
should be recognized as a sovereign. NVT has had an Indian
reserve 161 and IRA status.162 In addition, two judicial decisions have
recognized implicitly NVT's original self-government. 63 In setting
aside land for the Tyonek Indians, President Wilson recognized that
the Natives living at Tyonek constituted a distinct group. Similarly, in
establishing an IRA government, the federal government recognized
that the Tyonek Natives lived and worked together. 64 Although their
social organization may have been rudimentary, their adoption of an
IRA charter suggests that the Tyonek Natives had some form of self-
government. The Ninth Circuit in Fondahn v. Native Village of
Tyonek 165 and the Alaska Supreme Court in Ollestead v. Native Village
of Tyonek 66 have upheld the Tyonek Natives' exercise of certain
aspects of self-government. The Ninth Circuit recognized the Tyonek
council as spokesman for Tyonek Natives, 167 and the Alaska Supreme
Court assumed that the Tyonek Indians were a tribe or community.' 68
All of these factors--establishment of a reserve, presentation and
adoption of an IRA charter, and judicial acknowledgment-reflect a
recognition of original self-government. 69
2. ANCSA and NVTs Power TofExclude
ANCSA did not explicitly limit or terminate Native sovereignty;
however, it implicitly imposes substantial limits on the exercise of
161. See supra text accompanying note 81.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
163. Fondahn v. Native Village of Tyonek, 450 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1971); Ollestead v.
Native Village of Tyonek, 560 P.2d 31 (Alaska 1977). See supra note 124.
164. See supra notes 81 & 115 and accompanying text.
165. 450 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1971). See supra note 124.
166. 560 P.2d 31 (Alaska 1977). See supra note 124.
167. 450 F.2d at 521. See supra note 124.
168. 560 P.2d 31. See supra note 124.
169. In fact, by retaining anthropologists to gather evidence showing NVT's historical
unity under one leadership or government and by conditioning membership on being "of
the same or similar race" and in residence in the same village, NVT might meet the Mon-
toya test. See supra text accompanying notes 126-31.
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Alaska Native sovereignty 170 because it eliminates the circumstances
requisite to its exercise. 171 ANCSA removed "the basis for. . . sover-
eignty and. . . creat[ed] . . . obstacles to its administration." 172
The pattern of land and stock ownership that ANCSA establishes
is inconsistent with the Indian power to exclude non-members.1 73
ANCSA states that the policy of the Native claims settlement should
be accomplished "without establishing any permanently racially
defined institutions, rights, privileges or obligations. . . [and] without
creating a reservation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship." 174
This provision indicates that Congress intended ANCSA to be entirely
different from previous Indian legislation. ANCSA was not intended
to separate the Alaska Native community from modern America or to
establish a dependent Indian community; rather, it was designed to
advance the integration of Alaska Natives. The Act stresses the rights
of Alaska Natives as individuals and as U.S. citizens, as opposed to
their rights and identities as tribal members. 75 By vesting land own-
ership in corporations whose stock will eventually be alienable,176 the
Act contemplates that Alaska Natives may not remain an economic
unit separate from the rest of the U.S. economy. ANCSA therefore
promotes interaction between Natives and non-Natives.
NVT's ordinance excluding non-Natives is inconsistent with this
policy. The ordinance promotes the preservation of Indian culture,177
but it curtails interaction between Natives and non-Natives. More-
170. See supra notes text accompanying 72-74.
171. R. Price, supra note 26, at 70. See ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982);
United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Alaska 1977). Cf White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980) ("The Court has repeatedly
emphasized that there is a significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty, a com-
ponent which remains highly relevant to the pre-emption inquiry; though the reservation
boundary is not absolute, it remains an important factor to weigh in determining whether
state authority has exceeded the permissible limits.").
172. C. Groh, Native Sovereignty in Alaska 12 (1984) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
173. The federal government gave land and stock ownership to private corporations and
their individual shareholders, not to tribes. Individual shareholders will have the power to
alienate holdings in 1991. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h) (1982). The purpose behind this type of
settlement is to encourage individual self-determination. Id. at § 1601(c) (protecting and
promoting the rights or welfare of Natives as citizens of the United States and of Alaska, as
opposed to tribes or Natives). As such, it is inconsistent with traditional notions of tribal
sovereignty. See supra text accompanying notes 19-40. But see Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450(b) (1982), recognizing ANCSA villages and
regional corporations as "tribes" and implying that their "governing bodies" can obtain
Self-Determination contracts so long as they permit the "maximum participation" of
Natives in their affairs.
174. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1982).
175. See supra note 173.
176. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h) (1982).
177. Promoting preservation of Indian culture is sufficient to meet the Montana test of
tribal interest. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
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over, NVT has no land base; practically, the territorial boundaries
from which NVT would exclude non-Natives are unclear. Therefore,
NVT should be recognized as a sovereign, but it should not be permit-
ted to exclude non-Natives from the village.' 7 8
CONCLUSION
According to the traditional analysis, an Indian group may exer-
cise sovereignty if (1) the group is a "tribe" located in "Indian coun-
try" and (2) the power in question has not been explicitly limited by
federal treaty or statute and is not inherently inconsistent with the
federal-Indian relationship. This Note's proposed test replaces the
first part of the traditional test with an inquiry into whether natural
rights justify recognizing the Indian group in question as a sovereign
and specifically whether that group was originally a self-governing
group. The second part of the proposed test is similar to the second
part of the traditional test, inquiring whether the exercise of sover-
eignty is inconsistent with the federal-Indian relationship.
The traditional tribe-Indian country analysis is deficient when
applied to Alaska Natives because its formalistic criteria fail to take
into account the substantive reasons for recognizing and defining
Native sovereignty. Although analysis under both tests concludes that
NVT does not have the jurisdiction to exclude non-Natives from
Tyonek, the proposed analysis, by relying on substantive rather than
formalistic reasons, better recognizes and defines Alaska Native
sovereignty.
Blythe W. Marston
178. NVT does, however, retain thosef powers of self-government characteristic of
aboriginal tribes, except when limited by express provisions in federal statutes and treaties
or by restraints inherent in the federal-Indian relationship. See supra note 21 and accompa-
nying text. Powers that do not conflict with ANCSA include internal powers: (1) to adopt
and to operate a form of government, (2) to define conditions of tribal membership, (3) to
regulate domestic relations of tribal members, (4) to regulate property, if any, within tribal
jurisdiction, and (5) to control the conduct of members. See Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 564 (1981); F. COHEN, 1982 ed., supra note 1, at 246-57. The purposes and
policies of ANCSA, however, may so restrict the exercises of sovereignty that Alaska
Native entities may be no different than a private voluntary association.
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